Exposure to the Law: Accountability and its impact on Street Level Bureaucracy by Murphy, Mark & Skillen, Paul
Exposure  to  the  law:  accountability  and  its  impact  on  street  level
bureaucracy 
Word count: 6259
Abstract
Little  research  has  been  conducted  exploring  the  relationship  between  public  sector
accountability  and  the  law.  This  is  a  significant  oversight  given  the  potential  for  this
relationship to cause unintended consequences around issues of liability,  especially in the
context of a growing litigation culture. The purpose of the current research is to explore this
relationship, using qualitative studies of public sector professionals in England. The findings
of  the  study  suggest  that  increasing  emphasis  on  accountability  has  led  to  a  growing
magnification of legal risk in the public sector, with consequences for the ways in public
sector professionals perceive their relations with the public.    
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Introduction
The bureaucracy surrounding accountability has altered the landscape of public services since
its  development  in  the  last  several  decades.  In  particular,  the  implementation  of  quality
assurance mechanisms – audit, inspection, performance indicators, evaluation – has opened
up the public sector to ever greater scrutiny (Travers, 2007). Professions such as education,
health and social work are under increasing pressure to evidence accountability to the public
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and the public purse, with the mechanisms of this bureaucracy designed to increase formal
levels of accountability to the state while also making the public sector more accountable to
the public via marketisation and the development of a consumer culture.    
This trend towards ever increasing accountability is part of a broader agenda of regulation in
relation to public sector reform initiatives (James, 2005; Bundfred, 2006). Given its political
importance,  it  is  inevitable  that  debates  have  developed  over  the  usefulness  of  such  a
bureaucratic apparatus. Increasingly evidence suggests that these state bureaucratic systems,
rather than alleviate issues associated with a lack of public accountability, have unwittingly
managed to help facilitate their development in the first place (Ossege, 2010; Mendez and
Bachtler, 2011; Liff, 2014). The evidence from a range of studies indicates that accountability
can be a ‘double-edged sword’ (Papadapoulos, 2010: 1032), with a number of unintended
consequences arising from the reforms, including risk avoidance (Papadapoulos, 2010: 1032)
and what Bovens calls the ‘accountability trap’ (2010: 958), a trap in which public servants
achieve success in meeting accountability targets, yet are not ‘necessarily performing better
in the real world of policy-making and public service delivery’ (Bovens, 2010: 958). 
Problems associated with political accountability suggest it  deserves its ‘tricky’ reputation
(Barberis, 1998: 451), a reputation no more pronounced than in the context of public sector
regulation.  Attempts  to  manage and control  outcomes  via  mechanisms such as  audit  and
inspection face numerous difficulties (Scott, 2000) with the gap between the ideal and reality
(Bovens,  2010) often too wide to deliver satisfactory outcomes. This gulf  means that the
consequences of accountability are often unintended and unwanted, sometimes creating more
problems that they solve. Accountability arrangements, for all their value, ‘do not necessarily
produce better government’ (Bovens, 2010: 958).    
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Accountability  is  also  tricky because it  is  subject  to  numerous definitions,  depending on
context. For example, accountability as a set of mechanisms used by the state to regulate the
public  sector  is  distinct  from  the  public’s  perspective  of  accountability  as  bringing
professions and professionals to account. Procedures are also different for the public and the
state: members of the public can hold professionals to account by recourse to litigation, while
the state and its regulatory agencies have access to sanctions (e.g., withholding of resources,
fitness to practice procedures). On top of that, the notion of accountability now encompasses
numerous  other  understandings  that  have  taken  accountability  far  from  its  ‘core’ –  the
relationship between citizens and holders of public office (Mulgan, 2000, 556).         
The problems encountered when taking people and organisations to account can be seen as a
reflection of more troubling issues associated with regulatory regimes. Attempts to regulate
professional spaces of one kind or another are fraught with logistical, technical and temporal
issues.  Efforts  to  ensure compliance  can  often  be a  thankless  task,  thanks  in  part  to  the
existence of numerous other regulatory mechanisms – norms, value systems, the market, for
example – that deny political accountability a monopoly on social control (Parker, 2008). The
plurality of regulatory systems also confuses the means-ends rationality embedded in political
accountability  frameworks,  to  such  an  extent  that  associations  between  cause  and  effect
become impossible to verify. 
One increasingly evident example of this regulatory complexity is the prevalence of legal
forms  of  accountability  in  the  public  sector.  Recent  years  have  seen  the  spread  of  an
American-style litigation culture in the UK, with members of the public increasingly seeking
recourse to the law to achieve compensation, appeal or complain (Allsop and Jones, 2008).
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The increasing tendency of people to resort to litigation suggests that recourse to the law is
seen as a more immediate form of taking public services to account. Numerous aspects of
public sector work have been affected by the spread of litigation culture, with the health,
police  and  education  sectors  seeing  steady  rises  in  the  number  of  lawsuits  (Furedi  and
Bristow, 2012). 
Given  this  burgeoning  intersection  between  law  and  public  sector  accountability,  it  is
surprising that the relationship between political and legal forms of regulation has not been
explored in any detail. Using qualitative case studies of teachers, nurses and social workers in
England (via a combination of interviews and focus groups), the current study sought to plug
this  gap in  the literature by exploring the ways in  which the regulatory functions of the
bureaucracy  of  accouuntability  negotiate  the  much  older  function  of  law.  The  evidence
suggests  that  the  mechanisms  of  quality  assurance,  through  their  need  to  document  and
measure quality, can also act as the mechanisms of legal exposure, providing evidence for
both forms of regulation.  The paper  explores  the significance of this  development in the
context of debates over accountability and its role in shaping forms of democracy in public
life.
Exposure: Public-sector Accountability and the Law
The bureaucracy of  quality  assurance is  designed to  regulate  the actions  of public-sector
professionals, to hold their professions and institutions accountable to government and the
public.  Given  the  literature  on  unintended  consequences  of  bureaucratic  regimes,  this  is
evidently a challenging aim on which to deliver. A key reason for this gap between policy and
practice is the existence of what Lipsky (1980) famously coined street-level bureaucracy, via
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which forms of state-level bureaucracy must endeavour to deliver specific outcomes. The role
of  street-level  bureaucrats  as  a  variable  in  this  delivery  is  significant,  as  their  relative
autonomy in the face of bureaucratic imperatives  provides a space in  which professional
judgement and discretion are paramount. Just as significant in this context is their mediating
function  between  the  state  and  its  public.  As  Lipsky  put  it,  the  ‘essence  of  street  level
bureaucracy is that they require people to make decisions about other people’ (Lipsky, 1980:
161). They have the capacity to use discretion and professional judgement, and secondly they
exercise these professional capacities in dealing with members of the public.    
From a regulatory perspective, this space for autonomy and professional judgement, while a
bulwark  against  forms  of  centralised  decision  making,  becomes  more  problematic  when
placed in historical context. It is sometimes forgotten that it was concerns over professional
decision-making that acted as a key driver of quality assurance mechanisms in the first place.
The advent of these bureaucratic mechanisms in the United Kingdom was itself spurred on by
a  set  of  legal  challenges  to  public  sector  professions.  Cases  of  medical  malpractice  and
incompetence (in the health profession generally) led to the introduction of stronger systems
of government surveillance in the National Health Service (NHS) (Harrison and McDonald
2008: 44-45). Increasing concerns over professional incompetence in the NHS in the 1980s
(including the famous Bristol Royal Infirmary incident), resulted according to Travers (2007:
26), in the ‘creation of a new inspectorate for the NHS’ a development that took place despite
strong resistance from doctors  to  increased control  from central  government.  Causer  and
Exworthy (1999: 87) point to a series of child abuse investigations in the 1980s which ‘gave
rise to the development of further reporting and monitoring procedures’ in the field of social
care. The period also witnessed more strident attacks on failing schools and ‘bad’ teachers,
education therefore not immune from the demand for quality and accountability across the
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public services (Gewirtz, 1997). Here, the values of discretion and judgement, so important to
notions of professionalism, are as much sinners as sinned against. 
This importance of liability exposure as a key driver of quality assurance in the public sector
tends to be overshadowed by the discourse of new public management (Maesschalik, 2004:
466; Diefenbach, 2009: 906). While this discourse has played a significant role in shaping
understandings  of  bureaucratic  mechanisms (Morrell,  2006:  380),  the  perceived threat  of
unchecked professional ineptitude has also contributed to the growth of bureaucracy, a form
of governance in which the concept of accountability as risk management takes centre stage.
A good example of this conception in practice can be witnessed in clinical governance in the
British NHS,  which  has  been ‘specifically  politicised  and driven as  a  means  to  warding
against the risks clinicians have been perceived to pose’ (Brown and Calnan, 2010: 14).    
This type of risk illustrates the existence of forms of legal accountability alongside political
ones, a context evident in the process of auditing, which is itself a political mechanism of
accountability ‘permeated if not dominated by legal risk’ (Power, 1997: 139). Taking account
of legal regulation comes with its own set of effects in the public sector, professions such as
education finding themselves increasingly having to grapple with the finer points of law1. 
The  existence  of  legal  regulation  alongside  the  rise  of  quality  assurance  mechanisms,
suggests  that  Hupe and Hill  are  right  when they state  that  ‘accountability  of  street-level
bureaucrats is essentially multiple’ (Hupe and Hill, 2007: 279). Such a situation, however,
begs the question: What happens to the legitimacy of different regulatory functions? What
occurs when they intersect? This is a key question, as forms of regulation tend to valorise
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certainty over ambiguity, and boundedness over permeability. What happens to this certainty
in the real world of street-level bureaucracy?
 
Method
The purpose of the original study was to examine the impact of accountability mechanisms
on the work of public sector-professionals in the UK, specifically how mechanisms such as
audit  and  inspection  impact  on  their  relationships  with  the  public.  Included  among  the
research subjects were nurses, social workers and teachers. In total, nine interviews and three
focus groups were carried out, equally split between the three professions. The focus groups
were organised once relevant themes had been identified in the individual interviews. All
interviews  and focus  groups  were  conducted  in  the  same borough of  the  North-West  of
England. Given that three different professional groups were part of the study, it required
different strategies to access the respondents. In order for access to be obtained to subjects
that  could  provide  adequate  narratives  around  accountability  and its  consequences,  more
experienced personnel were requested to take part. 
This article reports only on the consequences related to legal regulation, although of course
these overlap with other aspects [see [authors] for a summary of findings related to time].
Although the  study was not  framed around particular  unintended consequences,  some of
these consequences came to the fore from an early point in the research. These included the
role of law as a regulatory mechanism and the nature of trust in professional relationships.
The results of the study are detailed below – please note that real names have been replaced
with pseudonyms.
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Findings: Exposure and its consequences: Litigation, risk and regulation
The capacity of accountability mechanisms to perform as witness to professional life brings
unavoidable pressure to bear on professional practice. The results of our research suggest that
the location of street-level bureaucrats between state and street accountability has helped to
create  something  of  a  legally  ambiguous  space  within  which  street-level  bureaucrats
increasingly practice their professions. Squeezed between the need to control liability on the
one hand and the threat of litigation on the other, this professional space has become home to
an increasingly exposed professional life.
Such exposure inevitably transforms that professional life to some degree. The combination
of political and legal exposure, alongside the presence of legal ambiguity, has created a set of
professional anxieties among the staff surveyed in our research, anxieties that are themselves
a product of risk, in particular the risk of evidential exposure. This risk anxiety on the part of
professionals is to some extent based on historical evidence. As one of the teachers in the
focus group stated, ‘there is a lot of litigation in schools and I think there is even more which
we just don’t hear about. I can think of at least 10 cases of litigation in five years at my
particular school’ (Laura, Teacher). The challenges of the modern classroom for teachers are
increased when dealing with children with special educational needs: 
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I have a child with Fragile X syndrome who throws things about, and again it’s about how
you manage that because you are worried that if she injures another child, will I get sued?
If I restrain her, then will the parents sue me? (Brian, Teacher).
This more cautious attitude to relationships has resulted in the development of a pro-active
response to perceived threats, as witnessed among nurses: 
You have a general feeling that if anything goes wrong, you will be sued. We also have to
be more careful as the patients can quote you as saying that you have given them some
information that perhaps was not the right information and the managers treat this very
seriously (Karen, Nurse). 
It is also the case that fear of litigation comes in different forms and at different intensities.
As social workers directly deal with the legal system, their fears tend to lack the bedrock of
confusion evident among the study’s teachers and nurses. Nevertheless, concern over being
sued appeared as part of their everyday working lives: 
We have got to be prepared if they (police or lawyers) come to investigate and you have
got to get it in to that system ... you could have it written down in your own notes but it
needs to be put down on the computer ... because someone could look on the system and
say that ‘This child has not been seen for six months!’…. I know that I have seen my
children on a regular basis … but if I had not had time to put it on the system then nobody
else would … this is a worry if it led to a legal case (Bob, Social worker).
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This fear of litigation is joined by a second order fear, the fear of risk. The need to control
legal risk, a key part of the rationale for quality assurance mechanisms, could be said to have
surfaced in the professional anxieties of those who have to police themselves on the front line
of public services. The avoidance of risk itself becomes a risky activity, one that tends to
frame  patient  interaction  as  an  encounter  that  needs  to  be  cautiously  negotiated.  While
mechanisms of accountability such as audit may be a ‘cosmetic process that hides real risk’
(Power, 1997), they also contribute to a professional working culture that endeavours to avoid
real risk. 
A specific form of risk avoidance situated in the accountability/law nexus relates to direct
physical contact with others. Although there are no specific accountability mechanisms that
attach themselves to physical space, there was a particular concern that street accountability
has  affected  their  ability  to  both  form meaningful  relationships  and  to  take  appropriate
professional action as they saw fit. As one of the teachers in the focus group put it, ‘10 years
ago I would have probably picked her up and sat her down next to me and now I worry about
doing that’ (Sue, Teacher). This sense of worry was also evident when talking to the nurses,
specifically a worry about how a particular action might be legally interpreted: ‘In the past if
you had a confused patient you could link arms with them and go and get a cup of tea. That
could be seen as restraining. You can’t do this anymore’ (Karen, Nurse). 
The fear of risk also surfaced with the potential for physical harm associated with particular
professional environments. Arguably a more significant rationale for litigation and claims for
compensation,  the dangers of injury to members of the public is a particular concern for
front-line  professionals,  especially  those  with  a  duty  of  care.  Although  litigation  in  the
medical  profession tends  to  grab the  headlines,  there  is  an increasing  focus  on the  risks
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attached to physical behaviour in schools. The dangers of school trips, for example, has been
a topic of debate in the UK, with some calling for the bureaucracy to be trimmed back so that
schools and teachers can offer more activities outside of the school environment (Furedi and
Bristow, 2012). One of the teachers in our study, however, indicates why some teachers prove
reluctant to take on school trips. Brian, the teacher involved, took the school pupils to an
indoor football tournament:                       
On my way back upstairs I heard a scream and found a child who had cut her head on the
railings. This worried me all night because if that parent took the risk assessment word for
word I would be picking up my p45 in the morning. I didn’t take the kids to any sports
things after that. I stayed at school and did my marking instead.        
Some caution in relation to litigation and the law is logical and justified. It could even be
argued that a certain level of risk avoidance comes under the remit of a duty of care. But
present in our research was a heightened level of professional anxiety.  The same teacher
reiterates this point when they say that, regarding the use of equipment, ‘I don’t think the risk
assessments would be water tight with a lawyer who is trained in a specific field ...  they
would tear it apart.’ Although Brian could never be sure what a lawyer would or could do in
this circumstance, the fact that the threat was there contributed to the professional’s sense of
uncertainty in dealing with pupils and their physical environments. One of the nurses, Marie,
echoed this sense of foreboding:
I had a phone call from someone the other day who told me he was going to inform his
solicitor  because I  didn’t  know what  his  mother  had to  drink on Friday and I  wasn’t
there ... she had gone back to a nursing home and they weren’t telling him anything.
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Although the prevalence of such anxiety is significant, it is the  impact of this professional
anxiety  on  service  that  is  arguably  more  worthy  of  attention.  The  quality  of  experience
offered to patients, clients and pupils, according to our research, can sometimes suffer in the
glare  of  legal  regulation.  One  example  of  this  is  the  case  of  behaviour  management  in
schools, a contested but necessary function of education professionals. The encroachment of
law into schools via equality legislation and health and safety law, alongside the threat of
litigation, has made the management of children in school settings more problematic than
previously. Behaviour management is affected by litigation ‘because you are pussy-footing
around them all the time and too frightened to discipline them properly’ (Sue, Teacher).
Law encroaches on the quality of social work care in other ways. The threat of litigation in
such a sensitive area of professional expertise means that, whether preparing for court  or
planning for complaints, more time is spent on paperwork than delivering care direct to the
client:  
You are always aware of complaints procedures you have to follow in terms of what you
have to write down and what you need to send. Ultimately it affects our supportive role
because you spend a lot  more time generating all  this  paper  work,  whereas  perhaps a
conversation on the phone could support them (foster carers) better than sending them
reams of papers (Alan, social worker).     
The mechanisms of exposure: procedures and paper trails 
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Using steering mechanisms such as audit and inspection to regulate professional behaviour
results in emphasis being placed on measured outcomes, which itself produces a culture of
evidential exposure. The paper trail is a pivotal point around which accountability and law
coalesce and reinforce each other. Paper trails count as evidence of accountability (or lack
of), but the trail can also count, in different circumstances, as legal evidence. The evidential
appetite of accountability mechanisms is one reason why so much time is devoted to them. 
The creeping nature of exposure creates a nervous and uncertain professional climate - one of
the senior nurses in the focus group put it bluntly when she stated that ‘I am frightened my
staff might miss something’ (Sarah, Nurse). Another suggested that:   
We do fear litigation ... we have to check notes and as a manager I am very conscious of
everything. It’s ticking boxes and we are told not to write down too much, but I feel we
should document everything just in case ... for example, things sometimes aren’t dated and
they wouldn’t stand up in a court of law (Claire, Nurse).
Although they work more directly with the legal system, ensuring that the paper trail is in
order is also a key concern for social workers. For social workers, the paper trail acts as both
a buffer against litigation while also fuelling concerns as to its status, particularly when time
does not allow staff to process the paper trail effectively:
I do worry that if something happened to one of my children and somebody came in and
seized the files, they would not be up to date … I know where they are, they are written
down but they are not on a system or in a file and that worries me because my time is so
ad hoc I would prefer it if I had an hour to get it together to say ‘there is the evidence’ …
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but you wouldn’t have that hour … someone could come in and get the file to ask why
something has happened to that child and that is a worry of mine (Bob, Social worker). 
This tangible fear of being caught out by either their own forgetfulness or ‘time compression’
(Pollitt, 2009) is a result of a combination of different pressures being brought to bear on
professional life. These pressures, even for social workers, cannot be considered the primary
focus of the profession, but are rather secondary add-on features to an already complex set of
routines. The fear associated with the law is as much a fear of exposure as it is a fear of
failure.                
Discussion
What  do  the  findings  tell  us  about  the  relationship  between political  and legal  forms of
regulation? They suggest that the evidential requirements of one form of regulation have the
unintended effect  of  increasing  exposure  to  another,  somewhat  more dormant,  regulatory
mechanism. Concerns over litigation means that street-level bureaucrats increasingly have to
grapple with forms of street-level accountability: Wedged in between state and street-level
accountability, the likes of teachers, nurses and social workers are, in effect, caught in the
crosshairs of a double regulatory whammy. 
What  the  findings  also  evidence  is  the  janus-face  of  evidential  exposure.  The evidential
requirements  of  accountability  constitute  a  double-edged  sword,  evidence  providing  a
platform  for  calling  individuals  and  institutions  to  account,  while  also  opening  up
professionals to liability exposure. This should not come as a surprise, however, given the
legal  history  of  current  accountability  arrangements.  The  findings  indicate  that  the
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bureaucracy of quality assurance has not escaped its juridical history, never quite managing to
shake  off  this  facet  of  its  genesis.  A case  could  be  made  that  accountability  and  its
mechanisms, due to the emphasis on evidential exposure, are more and more occupying the
ground between liability and litigation, reflecting Power’s argument that ‘legal risk enters the
audit process as liability exposure’ (Power, 1997: 139).  Although Power was referring to the
risk to the auditor, this statement could just as easily apply to public sector professionals. The
evidential nature of accountability mechanisms is fertile ground for exposure to legal risk.
What the bureaucracy of quality assurance contributes to professional life is a magnification
of this legal risk, evidential exposure prone to highlighting incompetence and the dangers of
unchecked  professional  discretion  and  judgement.  Although not  exclusively,  a  culture  of
mistrust  and  suspicion,  alongside  strategies  of  containment  and  professional  obfuscation
attached themselves to this form of bureaucracy early on, a set of values that have never quite
been shaken off. Magnified legal risk inevitably helps to strengthen this culture, a culture in
which ‘watching your back’ and ‘covering your tracks’ are paramount, and where emotions
such as fear and doubt are never far from the surface.     
The magnification of legal risk also has ramifications for goal conflict, an issue emphasised
by Lipsky as a recurring theme in the field of street level bureaucracy. For Lipsky (1980: 40),
goal conflict arose in the context of goal ambiguity and the ‘unavailability of appropriate
performance measures’, with such goal conflict having negative implications for the capacity
of street level bureaucrats to carry out their tasks. It could be argued that the issues illustrated
here represent a new twist on Lipsky’s concern over the impact of role expectations on goal
conflict, in which goal ambiguity is joined here by the presence of evidential ambiguity. To
some extent he pre-empted this connection in his account of the police force (1980: 47). He
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viewed the police as the street level bureaucrat most subject to conflicting goal expectations,
because  of  their  role  in  law  enforcement,  as  a  result  of  which  the  police  may  end  up
perceiving the public they come into contact with as ‘hostile yet dependent’ (1980: 47). While
such a  description  might  not  yet  apply  to  the  perceptions  of  nurses,  teachers  and social
workers, the evidence outlined here suggests a growing culture of ‘self-policing’ might be
embedding itself in professional practices.
That said, while there are similarities, it should not be taken as given that accountability has
equal effects across professions, or even within them. Other evidence suggests that there is a
degree of heterogeneity attached to the experiences of accountability mechanisms, with other
variables such as length of service coming into play. Exworthy and Halford (1999: 13), for
example,  while  identifying  similarities,  were  also  keen  in  their  study  to  emphasise  key
differences  between them – history,  structure,  timing and degree of change,  occupational
status – any of which have a bearing on the degree to which accountability helps or hinders
professional practice (see also Travers, 2007). 
This meshing of law and accountability points to another difficulty when assessing the impact
of bureaucracy on professional life. Given the state of confusion evidenced in this paper, it is
reasonable to ask the question: where does accountability end and what Habermas (1987:
357) calls ‘juridification’ begin? I.e., how much of what professionals see as a product of a
rampant audit  culture is  more of a manifestation of formal law strengthening its  hold on
professional practice? (see also Baxter, 2011: 55-56). This is a significant question, as the
ability to provide some kind of an answer could tell us more about the reaches and limits of
accountability and also the role of legislation in mediating professional relationships.          
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Conclusion 
The  research  detailed  in  this  paper  set  out  to  examine  the  impact  of  accountability
mechanisms on public sector workers and their capacity to fulfil their professional duties. The
research focused on how law mediates the relationship between accountability demands and
professional  work  of  street-level  bureaucrats.  The  findings  of  the  study  suggest  that  the
enmeshing  of  legal  and  political  regulation  has  its  own  sets  of  consequences.  These
consequences revolve around the entanglement of measurement and evidence at the street
level,  increasing  the  levels  of  professional  uncertainty,  liability  exposure  and  regulatory
complexity.
This paper, then, is a contribution to research exploring accountability and its consequences,
adding liability exposure to an ever-growing list of side-effects of the bureaucracy of quality
assurance. The emphasis on legal regulation as a mediating factor, however, should be seen as
a novel contribution to this specialised sub-field, given that this factor has been relatively
neglected in the literature. The paper also makes a strong contribution to the developing field
of  research  exploring  professional  discretion  more  generally  (for  example,  Tummers  and
Bekkers,  2014),  offering  what  Brodkin  (2008:  337)  calls  a  ‘street-level  approach  to
accountability’ which has  the  potential  to  highlight  aspects  of  policy  delivery  ‘that  other
analytic strategies do not capture’ (Brodkin, 2008: 327).      
Admittedly these findings are based on a small sample of participants and spread across three
professions, so the argument presented here should be viewed as one needing further testing
and refinement. Whilst the research focuses on the similarities between forms of street level
bureaucrat, further research is necessary to ascertain the extent of risk magnification within
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and  across  professions.  There  are  numerous  other  public  sector  professional  groupings,
including the police but also the fire service, probation and prison officers, care workers of
various stripes, that could be researched in a similar fashion and who might deliver a different
set of findings.
That said, the three professions covered in this study have in common a strong ethic of care
towards  their  publics,  whether  they  be  pupils,  patients  or  clients.  Adopting a  street-level
approach to these kind of professional groups can help us understand the limits of regulation
generally. What the findings indicate is that, just as there needs to be some balance between
professional autonomy and bureaucratic control, so there also needs to be a balance between
exposure and protection for street-level bureaucrats. It could be argued that the presence of
this magnified legal risk, for all its faults, can act as a check on the more malign aspects of
public  sector  professionalism – inefficiency,  insularity  and self-interestedness.  Proponents
could point to the cases of incompetence and neglect cited earlier in this paper as justification
enough  for  a  work  culture  that  keeps  professionals  ‘on  their  toes’ and  fearful  of  public
response.  If  the  findings  of  this  research  are  anything to  go  by,  however,  the  evidential
exposure  may  help  to  diminish  the  quality  of  service  delivery  rather  than  enhance  it.
Relations  of  trust  and respect,  surely  key components  of  any public  interface,  are  never
adequately served by a culture of suspicion and avoidance. 
There are  therefore potential  consequences  for end-users of  this  accountability/law nexus
which demand further  attention.  Even if  only indicated here,  the spread of a ‘hostile  yet
dependent’ relationship  between street  level  bureaucrats  and the  public  would cancel  out
whatever  benefits  might  accrue from further  accountability-led public  sector  reform.  The
need to ‘cover your tracks’ can potentially take precedence over a duty of care to end-users,
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whether they be patients, clients or pupils. Just as potentially damaging is the likelihood that
such approaches to their job might become routine over time, a development that Lipsky
viewed as a barrier  to professional change – i.e.,  patterns of practice that are ‘not easily
abandoned or changed because they are experienced by workers and outside observers as
virtual job requirements. People do not readily give up survival mechanisms’ (Lipsky, 1980:
87). Professional practice at the street-level, in both its more progressive and conservative
forms, is not easy to shift. 
Such a street-level approach can also help us to acknowledge the limitations of a ‘statist’
perspective to governance and regulation, in that the nuance of the ‘street-level’ can easily be
overshadowed. As Ball put it in relation to education policy (1994: 10-11), ‘policies are crude
and  simple.  Practice  is  sophisticated,  complex  and  unstable’.  The  professional  practice
detailed in this study reveal a front-line that embodies a set of conflicting imperatives where
tension is arguably the norm rather than the exception. The concerns of the professionals
illustrate  the  unpredictable  and  fragile  nature  of  dealing  with  other  people  in  a  formal
professional context which is also simultaneously a context of care, obligation and rights. 
These policy and theory limitations may have something to do with what Beetham (1996:
48) calls  a ‘serious limitation’ of theories of bureaucracy generally – i.e.,  that they ‘treat
bureaucracy in isolation, as a self-sufficient object of study, in abstraction from any social or
historical  context,  or any larger  theory of  society or  history.’ The street-level  perspective
provided in this study addresses some of these contextual failings, and points to the need for a
more elaborate study of the state and its capacity to govern public sector professionals, a set
of street-level bureaucrats with an every-increasing set of accountability demands. 
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